Take nothing for granted when seawater is involved might be one of the messages of the preliminary report on the failure of two Marin-Ark evacuation systems aboard the P&O ro-ro ferry Pride of Canterbury issued by Britain’s Maritime Accident Investigation Branch.

Correct deployment of Marin-Ark System (source: RFD Ltd)

Often regarded as a safer alternative to traditional evacuation by lifeboat for passenger ships, the Marin-Ark system, manufactured by RFD Ltd. of Belfast, involves dropping a chute from the ship with a liferaft built-in and passengers or crew sliding down into the waiting liferaft. One fatality is recorded in a chute-type escape system, when the casualty was jammed in a ‘piked’ position with the chute and suffocated but the system has been regarded as generally reliable.

On 1st February this year one of the Marin-Ark systems installed between decks on the Pride Of Canterbury was given an annual test as part of a joint European inspection. As the carriage mounted on hydraulic rams moved outboard to lower the chute and liferaft it caught on the outer doors, which had only partially opened. The carriage continued to move forward and upwards, twisted, broke deck plates loose and sheared the hydraulic rams off their mountings.

However, the liferafts were still tipped off the carriage, landed in the water and inflated as normal. It wasn’t possible to check how securely the chutes were attached and it was considered too dangerous to use them.

The second system was initiated but again fouled on the outer doors. The carriage was still able to move into the correct position and the rafts and chutes deployed normally. When the liferafts were being bowsed-in against the ship, however, the aluminium-clad stainless steel bowsing wires parted under tension.

Investigation showed that, even though the equipment was designed for the maritime environment, the hinges of the outer doors, which were mounted outside the ship, were fouled by salt and corrosion which prevented them from opening. This went unnoticed because there were no instructions to test or maintain the door hinges and the only time they were in use was during the annual inspection.

Similarly, the aluminium channels through which the stainless steel bowsing wires travelled were choked by corrosion, which prevented them moving freely.

Says the report: “The manufacturers inspected all other vessels fitted with similar equipment, and satisfied themselves that the equipment would function if required. They undertook a detailed technical investigation into the incidents and, in consultation with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, developed modifications to prevent similar faults from occurring in the future. The system was subsequently demonstrated on board Pride of Canterbury and the sister ship Pride of Kent, and found to work correctly.”

So, just because equipment is designed or intended to be virtually maintenance free and suitable for the marine environment, it pays not to take them for granted, and not to wait until an inspection to find out they don’t work as required.

Australia’s Transportation Safety Board has released its report on the fire aboard the BBC Islander last August. It isn’t a pretty sight. A fitter who couldn’t understand the ship’s SMS hot work requirements because it was in English, inadequate SMS procedures for risk assessment, lack of documentation on the whereabouts of damgerous cargo, and a firefighting team untrained in dealing with fire aboard ship.

In summary:

At 06541 on 14 August 2007, the Antigua and Barbuda registered general cargo ship BBC Islander anchored off Dampier, Western Australia. One of the tasks the crew were to complete while the ship was at anchor was the removal of steel brackets, or stoppers, which had been welded to the cargo hold hatch covers. The stoppers had been used to secure a heavy lift unit of cargo that had been discharged in Port Hedland the day before.

In the process of removing the stoppers from the aft cargo hold hatch covers with oxy-acetylene cutting equipment, the ship’s fitter inadvertently cut a hole in the hatch cover. As a result, sparks and molten metal fell into the cargo hold and onto the pallets of cargo stowed below.

At about 1340, the fitter noticed smoke coming from the aft cargo hold ventilator. The bridge watchkeeper was notified and the general alarm was sounded. By 1350, the master had consulted with the ship’s senior officers and decided to use the ship’s fixed fire extinguishing system to flood the cargo hold with carbon dioxide. However, the fire was not extinguished and, over the next eight hours, the ship’s entire supply of carbon dioxide was discharged into the cargo hold.

At 1610, the Dampier harbour master was notified and he organised for more cylinders of carbon dioxide to be delivered to the ship. He also arranged for the ship to be berthed at the Dampier Cargo Wharf.

By 1312 on 16 August, BBC Islander was all fast alongside the wharf and the Fire and Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia (FESA) took control of the fire fighting response. The fire fighters initially tried flooding the cargo hold with more carbon dioxide. They then removed some of the cargo to reach the seat of the fire and extinguish it with the use of fire hoses.

Eventually, the cargo hold was filled with high expansion foam. However, none of these actions extinguished the fire.

On 18 August, the fire was finally extinguished when an offshore supply vessel’s fire monitor was used to flood BBC Islander’s aft cargo hold with about 700 tonnes of seawater. The report identifies the following safety issues and issues recommendations and safety advisory notices to address them.

• • The ship’s cargo stowage plan was neither accurate nor complete. Consequently, the ship was in breach of the SOLAS requirements for the carriage of dangerous goods. However, more importantly, the ship’s master, its crew and the fire fighters were not armed with documentation that clearly outlined the location, and types, of dangerous goods that would be encountered during the emergency response on board the ship in Dampier.

• • The ship’s safety management system procedures did not provide sufficient guidance to ensure that the crew appropriately assessed the risks associated with removing the stoppers from the hatch covers. As a result, adequate precautions, in the form of a continuous fire watch inside the cargo hold, were not implemented before they started removing the stoppers.

• • The fitter removing the stoppers from the cargo hold hatch covers could not read English and hence could not fully understand the requirements of the ship’s safety management system hot work permit.

• • The fire fighters had received little training in fire fighting on board ships and had only limited experience in responding to such fires. As a result, the hatch covers were prematurely opened on 16 August to enable them to see the fire and assess the situation. Then, when they closed the hatch covers and flooded the hold with carbon dioxide, insufficient time was allowed for the carbon dioxide to extinguish the fire.

• • The application of a blanket of hi-expansion foam over the cargo, during the night of 17 August 2007, was effective in preventing the fire from spreading until the local stocks of foam concentrate were exhausted.

“too many seafarers are unaware that malaria is serious and potentially fatal; the real risk for seafarers is often miscalculated; seafarers are not familiar with the signs and symptoms of malaria; and seafarers do not protect against malaria sufficiently and do not take appropriate protective medication”

Just as I recieved reports of a malaria outbreak at the Hanjin Shipyard on the other side of Subic Bay, visible through the foliage of dipterocarps outside my office, the American P&I Club’s Currents carried an article by Dr. Rob Verbist, Director of Mediport Maritime Medical Service Antwerp, Belgium warning of the dangers of that disease so associated in the west with the European adventures of the 19th and early 20th century, when it was almost fashionable, but which today sickens more than half a billion people a year and kills up to 3 million, mostly children, annually.

Malaria gets its name from mal aria, or ‘bad air’, and was also known as ‘marsh fever’. American doctors during the US occupation of the Philippines in 1899-1902 believed it was the product of some sort of fumes coming out of the ground and sometimes recommended flooding the afflicted area, which only made things worse because the disease is carried by mosquitoes, ‘mozzies’, that thrive when there’s water around.

There are several types of malaria, falciparum being the most deadly.

For those with a historical bent, malaria in the Philippines is a bit of an oddity because, while elsewhere associated with low lying marshy areas, until a couple of hundred years ago it was mostly confined to the highland forests where the malaria-carrying mosquito preferred the local water-buffalo to people but did infect people who ventured into the areas once in a while, which is why forests were regarded as dangerous places filled with deadly spirits that made one sick.

Commerce changed all that. Clearance of lowland areas deprived people of their homes and forced them in the malarial forests where they became infected. These people went to the lowland marketplaces to buy food and to work on the new, vaste, rice farms, transmitting the disease to the lowland mosquito which bit them and then injected some other poor victim and epidemics of malaria followed.

With the rise of the timber industry, workers ventured into the forest to cut down trees, thus exposing themselves to the malaria mosquito and also carried it to the lowlands.

You don’t get malaria from other people but from the mosquito which has bitten an infected person. The mosquito actually has a good reason to bite, the ones that cause the problem are pregnant females whose sole aim in life is to secure a meal of blood for their offspring-to-be.

Where the Hanjin shipyard sits is at the base of a mountain which, until the 1960s, was richly covered with forest. The forest has been erased from the face of the earth, giving the malarial mosquito nowhere to go but down to the marshy lowlands.

In the first six months of 2007 some 321 cases of malaria were reported among workers at Hanjin and the surrounding areas.

By and large, malaria mosquitoes inhabit the sort of areas where you’re likely to find ports and shipyards and, therefore, seafarers. In some areas, malaria has built up a resistance to treatment so it’s worth checking out the World Health Organisation website for information to areas you might be calling at.

Malaria is an obvious threat to seafarers. Dr Verbist says: “too many seafarers are unaware that malaria is serious and potentially fatal; the real risk for seafarers is often miscalculated; seafarers are not familiar with the signs and symptoms of malaria; and seafarers do not protect against malaria sufficiently and do not take appropriate protective medication.”

So, I’ll wait here while you go and check out that you’ve taken the appropriate medication to prevent you getting malaria. For what it’s worth, quinine extracted from the bark of the cinchona tree was the first anti-malarial medicine but tasted so bitter that it was mixed into tonic water. The British, being what they are, found that grain alcohol helped it go down even better and thus was born the gin and tonic. However, entering a potentially malarial area is not an excuse for consuming gin and tonic on board.

Several medicines are now available and the choice may depend upon whether the malaria in a particular area is resistant to chloroquine.

Dr. Verbist says that those most at risk are seafarers staying onboard, at anchor, or taking shore leave; seafarers signing off , travelling inland, or joining the ship in that port; and the duration of stay, daytime or also at dusk ordawn (with higher risk).

Prevention is better than cure, which may be dubious anyway, so he gives the following advice: “Within 2 miles of a malaria shore it is important that:

• doors and windows are kept closed after dusk;
• any mosquitoes entering compartments are killed;
• insect spray is used, also under tables and chairs and in dark corners;
• long sleeved shirts and trousers are worn;
• pools of stagnant water, dew or rain are removed;
• refuse bags and bins are sealed properly;
• portholes, ventilation and other openings are covered with fine wire mesh; and
• lights are screened to avoid attracting mosquitoes.

Mosquitoes are most active in low light hours after dusk and prior to dawn. Air conditioning helps
to keep the mosquitoes away, it is important that it is left on all day. While sleeping, use undamaged
impregnated mosquito nets, put under the mattress, fixed on the four corners of the bed.”

If worst comes to worst, how do you recognise malaria? Beware of a fever or flu-like symptoms that develop between one and three months after entering a malaria zone. If there’s any doubt it’s best to start treatment immediately and call for radio medical advice.

Says Dr. Verbist: “Symptoms are flu-like and include fever (often exceeding 40°C), chills, malaise, nausea and vomiting, fatigue, myalgia (muscle pain), headaches, and sweating. A typical
attack lasts 8-12 hours.

“Three successive stages may be observed: (1) cold stage; (2) hot stage; and (3) sweat stage. These stages are often NOT observed in the lifethreatening “falciparum” malaria. A patient with severe falciparum malaria may present with confusion, drowsiness, extreme weakness and may develop cerebral malaria with convulsions, an unrousable coma and rapid death.”

Some shipping routes involve several short stays in malarial areas over a period of time so it’s wise to be prepared for standby emergency treatment. You’ll find some guidelines at seafarershealth.org, the International Committee On Seafarer’s Welfare, together with the brochure Malaria, You Are Part Of It, and three posters which you can download and print out for display at the top of this page.

NEW: The Case Of The Bendy Boxer

She was big, she was fast, she could take a beating, but a whipping sent her to pieces.

The first of a two-part episode on the structural failure of the MSC Napoli

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